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1. Introduction
Shareholders ultimately bear the agency costs su¤ered by other stakeholders (Jensen and Meckling,
1976). Therefore, it appears intuitive that they should pay the manager according to rm value,
rather than equity value alone. In particular, Jensen and Meckling speculated that granting the
manager equal proportions of debt and equity might attenuate the stockholder-bondholder conicts
that arise when the manager is purely equity-aligned. However, this idea of compensating the
manager with inside debt1 has not since been pursued further. Instead, the intervening three
decades of compensation theories have focused on justifying equity-like instruments, such as stock
and options. In particular, a number of models suggest that bonuses for avoiding bankruptcy,
salaries or managerial reputation are adequate remedies to the agency costs of debt, leaving no
role for inside debt in e¢ cient compensation (see, e.g., Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1992; Brander and
Poitevin, 1992; John and John, 1993). However, the substantial bondholder losses in the recent
nancial crisis suggest that the agency costs of debt are not fully solved.
Theoristsfocus on rationalizing equity pay has likely been driven by the long-standing belief
that, empirically, executives do not hold debt (see, e.g., the survey of Murphy, 1999). Accordingly,
Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) seek to answer the question why are managersmonetary incentives
... traditionally correlated with the value of equity rather than the value of debt? However, recent
empirical studies (Bebchuk and Jackson, 2005; Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; Gerakos, 2007; Wei
and Yermack, 2009) nd that U.S. CEOs hold substantial dened benet pensions. These are
unsecured, unfunded obligations which, in nearly all cases, have equal priority with other creditors
in bankruptcy and thus constitute inside debt.2 Researchers have also noted the common use of
deferred compensation, another form of inside debt, although systematic studies have so far been
limited by data availability.3
Inside debt is therefore widespread. Such compensation contrasts with existing theories, which
do not advocate debt but instead the exclusive use of equity-like compensation. Indeed, Sundaram
and Yermack note the lack of a theoretical framework for their results: the possibility of using
debt instruments for management compensation has received little attention ... A top priority
would appear to be the development of theory that illustrates conditions under which debt-based
compensation ... represent[s] the solution to an optimal contracting problem.Does the absence of
a theoretical justication mean that inside debt constitutes rent extraction, as argued by Bebchuk
and Jackson?4 Or can it be part of e¢ cient compensation, and if so, under what conditions? Should
the managers debt-equity ratio equal the rms, so that he is aligned with rm value as Jensen
and Meckling hypothesized? What factors a¤ect the optimal level of inside debt?
1This paper denes insidedebt as debt (or any security with payo¤s very similar to debt) held by the manager.
It contrasts with outside debt, which is held by external investors.
2See Section 4 for further discussion of the priority of pensions in bankruptcy.
3Despite limited data, anecdotal evidence suggests that such compensation may be substantial. For example,
Roberto Goizueta, the former CEO of Coca-Cola, had over $1 billion in deferred compensation when he died. Wei
and Yermack (2009) consider total inside debt holdings (pensions plus deferred compensation).
4An alternative view is that pensions are tax motivated. Bebchuk and Jackson (2005) and Gerakos (2007)
provide a number of arguments against this explanation, most notably that executive pensions enjoy a di¤erent tax
status from employee pensions. This paper takes a neutral stance: if pensions are indeed tax-motivated, the model
investigates whether the tax system encourages rms to adopt otherwise ine¢ cient compensation schemes.
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These questions are the focus of this paper. We start with a model in which the manager makes
a project selection decision; the optimal project depends on a signal privately observed by the
manager after contracting. We consider a set of standard securities: debt, equity and a xed bonus
that pays o¤ only in solvency, and initially assume that the manager holds an exogenous equity
stake to create risk-shifting incentives. We demonstrate that inside debt is a superior remedy to
the agency costs of debt than the bonuses advocated by prior research. Bonuses are e¤ective in
encouraging the manager to avoid bankruptcy, since they are only received in solvency. However,
creditors are concerned with not only the probability of default, but also recovery values in default.
Optimal contracts should therefore depend on the value of assets in bankruptcy, as well as the
occurrence of bankruptcy. This is the critical di¤erence between inside debt and bonuses: inside
debt yields a positive payo¤ in bankruptcy, proportional to the liquidation value. Thus it renders
the manager sensitive to the rms value in bankruptcy, and not just the incidence of bankruptcy
exactly as desired by creditors. By contrast, bonuses have zero bankruptcy payo¤s, regardless of
the liquidation value, and so represent binary options rather than debt.
This di¤erence in payo¤s is important. Even in situations where bonuses can attenuate risk-
shifting, inside debt can be a cheaper solution since its sensitivity to liquidation values renders it
a more powerful instrument. Moreover, in some settings, bonuses aggravate risk-shifting owing to
their binary nature. Since they only pay o¤ in solvency, the manager may ine¢ ciently sacrice
liquidation value to gamble for solvency. The same issues apply to other instruments which have
zero payo¤in bankruptcy regardless of the liquidation value, e.g. salary (if it is junior to creditors) or
reputation (under Hirshleifer and Thakors (1992) assumption that the labor market can only assess
the incidence rather than severity of bankruptcy.) For brevity, we refer to all of these instruments
as bonuses.These alternative measures were shown to be adequate under specic frameworks
in which only sensitivity to the incidence of bankruptcy matters, such as where solvency can be
guaranteed (John and John, 1993), or liquidation value is always zero (Hirshleifer and Thakor).
In the more general setup of this paper, the manager can a¤ect the liquidation value and so his
compensation should be sensitive to it.
We then extend the model to incorporate an e¤ort decision, which allows us to endogenize the
managers equity stake. This analysis extends previous models which focus on the agency costs
of debt (project selection) and do not incorporate the agency costs of equity (e¤ort). This is a
necessary extension, since in the absence of a shirking problem, risk-shifting can be trivially solved
by removing the managers equity and giving him a at salary; here, equity compensation is optimal
to induce e¤ort. The compensation scheme typically does not involve pure equity compensation (as
advocated by some existing research) nor giving the manager debt and equity in equal proportions
(as intuition might suggest, and as Jensen and Meckling hypothesized). In the most common
case, equity is more e¤ective than debt in inducing e¤ort and so an equity bias is desired, where the
managers percentage equity stake exceeds his percentage debt holding. Even though an equity bias
leads to occasional risk-shifting, this is compensated for by greater e¤ort. The optimal debt-equity
mix depends on the relative importance of these two agency problems the ratio of debt to equity
is increasing in leverage, the probability of bankruptcy and the managers impact on liquidation
value, but decreasing in growth opportunities (i.e. the e¤ect of e¤ort on solvency value). However,
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a debt bias, where the managers percentage debt stake exceeds his percentage equity holding, may
be optimal if e¤ort has a high expected payo¤ in bankruptcy, either because bankruptcy is likely, or
because e¤ort is particularly productive in enhancing liquidation value. In contrast to the agency
costs of equity nomenclature, suboptimal e¤ort may result from insu¢ cient inside debt, rather
than equity. Indeed, a debt bias is found by Sundaram and Yermack (2007) in 13% of cases.
Finally, we relate the models empirical implications to recent ndings. Most notably, inside debt
compensation is widespread, whereas solvency-contingent bonuses have not yet been documented.
Also as predicted, pensions are increasing in rm leverage (Sundaram and Yermack), decreasing in
growth opportunities (Gerakos, 2007) and associated with lower risk-taking, as measured by the
rms distance to default(Sundaram and Yermack) or credit rating (Gerakos). Wei and Yermack
(2009) nd that disclosures of large inside debt holdings lead to an increase in bond prices and a
fall in equity prices. In addition, the model provides a theoretical framework underpinning recent
normative proposals to reform executive pay by compensating the manager with debt as well as
equity, to help prevent the signicant bondholder losses that manifested in the recent nancial crisis
(see, e.g., Bebchuk and Spamann, 2009.)
Jensen and Meckling (1976) were the rst to theorize the agency costs of debt. They include a
brief verbal section wondering why inside debt (awarded in the same proportion as inside equity) is
not used as a solution, but are unable to incorporate this dimension formally into our analysis in
a satisfactory way.They speculate that the managers salary is a su¢ cient mechanism and thus
have no role for inside debt. This paper shows that salaries are problematic given their insensitivity
to liquidation value, and that equal proportions of debt and equity are generally suboptimal.
John and John (1993), Brander and Poitevin (1992) and Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992) also
demonstrate that the agency costs of debt can be alleviated through certain compensation in-
struments. Since their goal is to show the e¤ectiveness, rather than optimality, of their proposed
solutions, they do not consider whether alternative mechanisms, such as inside debt, would be
superior. A second distinction is that this paper incorporates the agency costs of equity as well as
of debt. This provides an endogenous justication for the equity compensation that is the cause
of asset substitution and allows analysis of the trade-o¤ between e¤ort and project selection, thus
leading to empirical predictions on the optimal ratio of debt to equity.5 Hirshleifer and Thakor
(1992) show that managerial reputation (assumed to be zero in all bankruptcy states) can deter
risk-shifting. In their model, liquidation value is always zero and so only sensitivity to the prob-
ability of bankruptcy matters. In the more general setup of this paper, the manager can a¤ect
the liquidation value and so his compensation should be sensitive to it, which is not achieved by
a binary instrument.6 John and John (1993) advocate two solutions to risk-shifting. The rst is a
solvency-contingent bonus, which has similar issues to reputation owing to its binary payo¤. The
5Jensen and Meckling consider the agency costs of debt and equity separately, not simultaneously. Biais and
Casamatta (1999) and Hellwig (2009) do consider both agency costs together. They do not analyze executive
compensation (which remains pure equity), but an entrepreneurs choice of outside nancing. Stoughton and Tal-
mor (1999) also consider contracting under both an e¤ort and investment decision. Investment is undertaken by
shareholders (rather than the manager) and does not involve risk-shifting as the rm is unlevered.
6While Hirshleifer and Thakor consider reputation in the managerial labor markets, Diamond (1989) considers
reputation in debt markets and shows that it can deter risk-shifting; however, it requires the manager to expect to
continue to raise debt in the future. The solutions considered here and in earlier papers work in a one-shot game.
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second is to reduce the managers equity. This is possible as their model has no e¤ort decision;
indeed, there is no reason to give the manager any incentive pay. Brander and Poitevin (1992)
propose a more general xed bonus, which may be triggered at levels other than solvency. They
note that if the rm is su¢ ciently levered, no bonus can eliminate the agency costs of debt. Here,
inside debt is e¤ective even where bonuses are impotent.
Dybvig and Zender (1991) (DZ) show that an optimal contract can alleviate the Myers and
Majluf (1984) lemons issue, thus resurrecting the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance theorems. Al-
though they focus on adverse selection rather than risk-shifting, the insight that incentives can
achieve rst-best is potentially applicable to other agency problems. However, their interest is not
on what the contract is, but that an optimal contract (whatever form it may take) can render
nancing irrelevant. By contrast, this paper is focused on the form of pay. First, it shows that
inside debt can be superior to the instruments advocated by a number of earlier papers, whereas
DZ do not compare di¤erent contracts. Second, we analyze the optimal relative proportions of debt
and equity, generating empirical predictions on the cross-sectional determinants of the inside debt
level. While the optimal contract in the core DZ model aligns the manager with rm value, here
the manager should not hold debt and equity in equal proportions if there is an e¤ort decision.7
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 considers a project selection model and shows that
inside debt can be a superior remedy than bonuses to the risk-shifting concerns that arise if the
manager is exogenously equity-aligned. Section 3 endogenizes equity compensation by adding an
e¤ort decision, and relates the optimal levels of equity and debt to rm characteristics. Section 4
discusses empirical implications and Section 5 concludes. The Appendix contains proofs.
2. Debt and Project Selection
2.1 THE MODEL
The model consists of four periods. At t =  1, shareholders o¤er a contract to the manager.
At t = 0, risky debt is raised with face value of F and market value D0 < F . t = 0 total rm
value (gross of expected pay) is V0 = E0+D0. All agents are risk-neutral and the risk-free rate and
reservation wage are normalized to 0. Bondholders observe the managers contract when calculating
D0, and so at t =  1; shareholders select the contract that maximizes V0 minus expected pay. The
assumption that F is exogenous is discussed at the end of Section 2.2:
At t = 1, the manager chooses one of two mutually exclusive projects: R (risky) or S (safe). (S
can be thought of as the rms status quostate, and the manager is deciding whether to switch
to the riskier project R.) R has probability pR of success, in which case the rm is worth VGR
at t = 2. In failure(which occurs with probability (1  pR)), rm value is VBR. S pays VGS with
probability pS, and VBS otherwise. We assume that pR  pS, VGR  VGS  VBS  VBR, VGR > F
and VBS < F : failure of either project leads to bankruptcy, and success of R leads to solvency.
7When DZ extend their model by introducing an e¤ort decision, they are unable to solve for the optimal contract
and note that the solution may not exist. This does not matter for them, since the form of the contract and its
comparative static determinants are not the focus of their paper. Their goal is to show that if there is a solution,
it is independent of capital structure.
5
We subdivide the model into two cases, depending on whether the success of S leads to solvency:
VGS  F (Case 1) and VGS < F (Case 2). At t = 2, all payo¤s are realized and the debt matures.
If all parameters were known at t =  1, shareholders would know the optimal project and can
implement it with certainty. In reality, unforeseen projects often appear after pay is set, and so
the contract should induce the manager to accept (reject) any new project R that appears and
o¤ers a higher (lower) NPV than the status quo S. We therefore assume VGR  U [VGS; VGRH ] :
The optimal project is not known in advance; either R or S may be rst-best depending on the
realization of VGR, which is observed privately by the manager at t = 1. All other parameters are
public at t =  1.
While the core model focuses on project selection, it can easily be extended to involve other
agency costs of debt. Hence the terms asset substitutionand risk-shiftingshould be interpreted
as any action that benets shareholders but reduces total rm value. Other examples include debt
overhang, concealing information, failing to disinvest, or paying excessive dividends. Many of these
actions were believed to be important in the recent nancial crisis.
Prior research on the solutions to (rather than causes of) risk-shifting typically take risk-shifting
incentives as given by assuming that the manager exogenously owns a proportion  of the rms
equity, and shows that certain compensation instruments can remove these incentives (e.g. John
and John, 1993). This section follows this approach by also taking  as exogenous and deriving the
optimal accompanying compensation scheme; Section 3 endogenizes  through the introduction of
an e¤ort decision. Our goal is to show whether and under what conditions debt is superior to the
bonuses previously advocated, and so we allow the accompanying scheme to consist of a fraction 
of the rms debt and/or a bonus of J , paid if and only if the rm is solvent. The debt is locked
up (similar to restricted stock) to prevent its subsequent sale or renegotiation; indeed, pension
claims and deferred compensation cannot be sold in practice.  and J are choice variables, whereas
 is currently xed. Note that  > 0 can arise exogenously even without the rm granting equity,
for instance if the managers labor market reputation is linked to the equity price (e.g. Hirshleifer
and Thakor, 1992; Gibbons and Murphy, 1992).
Case 1: VGS  F
Incentive compatibility requires the manager to choose S, i.e., inequality (2) below is satised,
if and only if it has a higher NPV, i.e., inequality (1) is satised:
pRVGR + (1  pR)VBR  pSVGS + (1  pS)VBS; (1)
i¤ pR[(VGR   F ) + F + J ] + (1  pR)VBR
 pS[(VGS   F ) + F + J ] + (1  pS)VBS: (2)
The and only ifrequirement ensures that the contract does not lead to excessive conservatism.
If and only if R has a higher NPV, the contract must ensure that the manager chooses R over S.
The Appendix shows that the above is satised if and only if:
6
 =   J(pS   pR)
F (pS   pR) + (1  pS)VBS   (1  pR)VBR : (3)
Under rst-best project selection, R is chosen if and only if VGR exceeds a cuto¤ V GR, where
V GR =
pSVGS + (1  pS)VBS   (1  pR)VBR
pR
:
Let q = Pr(VGR > V GR), i.e. the probability that R is rst-best. The optimal compensation
scheme is the cheapest incentive compatible contract, i.e. solves
min
;J
q [pR (F + J) + (1  pR)VBR] + (1  q) [pS (F + J) + (1  pS)VBR] s.t. (3): (4)
Proposition 1. If VGS  F , the optimal compensation scheme (; J) is given by8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
(; 0) if pR(1  pS)VBS > pS(1  pR)VBR;
  J(pS pR)
F (pS pR)+(1 pS)VBS (1 pR)VBR ; J

if pR(1  pS)VBS = pS(1  pR)VBR;
where J 2

0; 

F +
(1  pS)VBS   (1  pR)VBR
pS   pR

;
0; 

F +
(1  pS)VBS   (1  pR)VBR
pS   pR

if pR(1  pS)VBS < pS(1  pR)VBR:
(5)
If pS >> pR and VBS is close to VBR, the main advantage of S over R is its greater probability
of solvency. Hence the bonus should be used exclusively: its zero bankruptcy payo¤ makes it
particularly sensitive to solvency. Indeed, John and John (1993) assume pS = 1 and nd that a
bonus can be e¤ective. However, if pS is close to pR and VBS >> VBR, the main advantage of S is
its greater liquidation value. Inside debt should be used exclusively as, unlike the bonus, its payo¤
is sensitive to liquidation value. Indeed, if pS = pR, the bonus is completely ine¤ective.
Case 2: VGS < F
If VGS < F , the rm is denitely liquidated if S is undertaken. Even though it leads to certain
liquidation, S can still be preferred, if (1) is satised. The incentive constraint (3) becomes:
 = +
pRJ
pSVGS + (1  pS)VBS   (1  pR)VBR   pRF : (6)
Proposition 2. If VGS < F , the optimal compensation scheme (; J) is given by  = ; J = 0:
In Case 1, (3) shows that bonuses (partially) alleviate asset substitution and reduce the amount
of inside debt required. In Case 2, bonuses exacerbate asset substitution owing to their binary
nature. Since VGS < F , the bonus is only received if the risky project is chosen and is successful. It
thus induces the manager to choose R, even if (1) is satised and so voluntary liquidation through
the choice of S is e¢ cient. Introducing a bonus increases the level of debt required to achieve
optimal project selection (see (6)) and so is counter-productive. The optimal compensation scheme
therefore involves zero bonus and only inside debt. This may explain why the solvency-contingent
bonuses advocated by prior literature are rarely used. Since inside debt is even more favored in
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Case 2, we consider Case 1 for the remainder of the paper.
2.2 DISCUSSION
We now discuss whether alternative mechanisms can attenuate asset substitution and thus render
inside debt unnecessary. Jensen andMeckling (1976) speculated that salaries might constitute inside
debt. Most theory papers (e.g. Innes, 1990) assume that salary is junior to creditors and thus not
received in bankruptcy; this is indeed the case in countries with pure liquidation bankruptcy codes
and little room for renegotiation in debt workouts (Calcagno and Renneboog, 2007). In such a
case, salary functions like a bonus and is thus di¤erent from inside debt. By contrast, Calcagno
and Renneboog cite bankruptcy regulations in certain countries (e.g. US, UK and Germany) that
management can use to ensure that salaries are senior to creditors in a bankruptcy, and give a
number of examples where this occurred. If salaries are received in all states of nature, they have
no e¤ect on incentive constraints and thus the managers decisions. (They do not mention any
cases in which salaries have equal priority to other creditors, nor are we aware of any.)
Private benets, such as rm-specic human capital, prestige, perks, and the present value of
future wages are principally determined by whether the rm is solvent: if the manager is red upon
bankruptcy, he can no longer derive benets from incumbency, regardless of liquidation value. They
therefore have a very similar e¤ect to bonuses J . Moreover, private benets plausibly increase with
shareholder value and thus may be incorporated into , increasing the need for inside debt.
In the model, the face value of debt is set at the rst-best level F , which is optimal in the absence
of agency costs of debt. These costs are foreseen by rational creditors and thus shareholders su¤er
a discount when raising debt. Alternatively, the trade-o¤ theory would advocate lowering debt to a
second-best level F SB < VBR, so that the rm is never bankrupt and no discount is su¤ered. This
loses some of the benets of debt, such as tax shields. Either way, shareholders have an incentive to
reduce the agency costs of debt, to augment tax shields or to reduce the discount. Results would be
unchanged (at the cost of complicating the model) if F was endogenized through the introduction
of taxes, as in Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992): inside debt allows the rm to increase F and thus
create additional tax shields.
Covenants are an imperfect solution due to the incompleteness of contracts: see, for example,
the discussion in Myers (1977). Covenants may increase asset substitution, as the manager risk-
shifts even when the rm is some distance from bankruptcy to avoid breaching the covenant. Also,
covenants may not be breached until after the key decision has been made (e.g., R was irreversibly
chosen and failed, leading to the covenant violation).8
3. Debt, Equity, Project Selection and E¤ort
Section 2 followed prior literature by taking  as exogenous and deriving the optimal accompanying
compensation scheme to achieve e¢ cient project selection. However, a complete analysis must
8Several studies demonstrate that executive compensation has a signicant e¤ect on risk, despite covenants.
Examples include DeFusco et al. (1990), Guay (1999), and Coles et al. (2006).
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provide an endogenous justication for equity compensation, else the optimal contract would be  =
 = 0. This section endogenizes  > 0 as the solution to an e¤ort problem. In addition to project
selection, the manager now also makes an e¤ort decision. He chooses a pair (eg; eb) where eg; eb 
[0; eH ] and eH < 1. eg increases the rms solvency value by g with probability eg and costs the
manager 1
2
e2g; eb increases the rms bankruptcy value by b with probability eb, where VBS + b < F ,
and costs the manager 1
2
e2b . If the rm has abundant intangible growth opportunities, such as
employee training and building customer relationships, g will be high; if there is scope to scrap
investment projects or liquidate assets, b will be high.
To keep the model tractable in the presence of an e¤ort decision, it is necessary to specialize
it to pR = pS = p. This rules out complex feedback e¤ects between e¤ort and project selection.9
The two decisions can thus be analyzed separately, allowing the e¤ects of compensation on each
to be seen cleanly. For example, an increase in  directly raises e¤ort, since the manager benets
more from enhancing liquidation value. Raising  also directly leads to S being chosen with greater
frequency. If pR = pS = p, this change in project selection does not a¤ect the probability of solvency
(which always equals p ), and thus does not feed back into the e¤ort decision (which depends on
the probability of solvency). If instead pS > pR, the greater frequency with which S is chosen leads
to a higher probability of solvency. If e¤ort is particularly productive in solvency, this creates a
positive feedback e¤ect on e¤ort: in (8) below, eg is increasing in the probability of solvency. While
such feedback makes it easier to justify inside debt, the model can no longer be solved analytically
since project selection and e¤ort cannot be considered separately. A consequence of pR = pS is
that the bonus is ine¤ective (see Proposition 1) and so e¢ cient compensation involves debt and
equity alone. Note that even with pS > pR, the bonus provides no incentives to exert e¤ort: a
rise in bankruptcy value has no e¤ect on the bonus but increases the value of inside debt. Thus, if
inside debt is preferred to bonuses for solving asset substitution, it remains superior when an e¤ort
decision is introduced.
Shareholders maximize rm value net of pay to the manager, i.e. solve
max
;
V0   E0   D0 = max
;
(1  )E0 + (1  )D0; (7)
subject to   0 and   0.10 We rst consider the managers e¤ort decisions.
9Tractability concerns also motivate the assumption that e¤ort only a¤ects rm values, not the probability of
success. If e¤ort a¤ects both parameters, it is impossible to solve analytically for the managers e¤ort choice, and
to compute the e¤ect of compensation on e¤ort. In reality, it is plausible that e¤ort increases the probability of
success. This has a very similar e¤ect to raising g, the value created by e¤ort in success, in the analysis that follows
(i.e. it increases the optimal ratio of  to ), and thus has the same comparative static e¤ect.
10This is because of limited liability. In addition, we rule out  < 0 since it is illegal for CEOs to short their own
rm. Allowing  < 0 would, under some parameters, lead to the uninteresting result that the CEO should borrow
to buy the entire rm. It is standard that a moral hazard problem under risk neutrality requires limited liability,
otherwise the rst-best can always be achieved. In addition,  < 0 would correspond to the CEO being given a loan
by his rm. In the U.S., executive loans were prohibited by the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
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Lemma 1. The manager chooses e¤ort levels
eg = pg; (8)
eb = (1  p)b:
We now consider project selection. Firm value is maximized if R is selected if and only if
VGR > V

GR, where V

GR is dened by
V GR = VGS +
(1  p)
p
(VBS   VBR): (9)
However, the manager will choose R if and only if VGR > V GR, where
V GR = VGS +
(1  p)
p
(VBS   VBR): (10)
The cuto¤ V GR is undened for  =  = 0, since the manager is indi¤erent between all projects.
We assume that he chooses the e¢ cient project as this is Pareto optimal.11 The optimal levels
of debt and equity are determined by a trade-o¤ between their di¤erential e¤ects on e¤ort and
project selection. We are interested not only in the absolute levels of  and  but also their relative
magnitudes  in particular, Jensen and Meckling (1976) speculated the optimal compensation
scheme would involve  = . We thus also study the ratio = which we dene as k. In particular,
we are interested in whether k = 1 (i.e.  = ) or whether the contract involves an equity bias
(k > 1) or a debt bias (k < 1). Our main results are summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3. The optimal compensation scheme (; ) satises the following:
(i)  < 1
2
and  < 1
2
;
(ii) If p2g2 + (1   p)2b2 > VGRH+VGS
2
+ 1
2
(1 p)2
p
(VBS VBR)2
VGRH VGS + (1   p)VBR and (1   p)2b2   [pF +
(1  p)(VBS   VBR)]  0, then  > 0;
(iii) If p2g2 + (1  p)2b2 > VGRH+VGS
2
+ 1
2
(1 p)2
p
(VBS VBR)2
VGRH VGS + (1  p)VBR and
2(1 p)2
p
(VBS VBR)2
VGRH VGS +
(1  p)2b2 > pF + (1  p)VBR, then  > 0.
If the conditions in (ii) and (iii) are satised, we also have the following comparative statics:
(iv)  is increasing in b;  is increasing in g;
(v) If pF + (1  p)VBR > 2(1  p)b2, then k < 1. k is increasing in VBS   VBR and decreasing
in g and p;
(vi) If p

VGRH+VGS
2
  F  > p2g2 + 1
2
(1 p)2
p
(VBS VBR)2
VGRH VGS , then k
 > 1. k is increasing in b, and
decreasing in VBS   VBR and F.
(vii) D0 is increasing in , E0 is decreasing in .
We now discuss the intuition behind each component of Proposition 3. Starting with part (i),
increasing  augments e¤ort, but is costly to the rm. Given the convex cost function, equity has a
diminishing marginal e¤ect on e¤ort; when   1
2
, this benet is insu¢ cient to outweigh the costs
and so the optimal  is less than 1
2
. A similar argument applies for .
11If we instead assume that he always takes project R if  =  = 0, this allows us to drop the rst condition in
parts (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 3.
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The common condition in parts (ii) and (iii), p2g2+(1 p)2b2 > VGRH+VGS
2
+ 1
2
(1 p)2
p
(VBS VBR)2
VGRH VGS +
(1  p)VBR, is su¢ cient to rule out the optimum involving  =  = 0. Intuitively, if e¤ort is very
unproductive (g and b are small), then it is not worth giving the manager incentive compensation
to induce e¤ort; instead, the rm should set  =  = 0 to guarantee optimal project selection. The
condition guarantees that e¤ort is su¢ ciently important for at least one of  or  to be strictly
positive.
Combining this with the second condition in part (ii) is su¢ cient to guarantee  > 0. The
latter is a technical condition to rule out a boundary case. If b is high, then e¤ort is e¤ective in
bankruptcy; if p is low, bankruptcy is likely. Both factors mean that e¤ort has a high expected
productivity in bankruptcy; since debt is sensitive to the bankruptcy payo¤, the optimal  is
high. The disadvantage of high  is that it leads to excessive conservatism in project selection,
and so  > 0 is typically optimal to counterbalance this. However, if  is su¢ ciently high that
(1 p)
p
VBS VBR
VGRH VGS > 1, then we are at the boundary case where S is always selected. The cuto¤
V GR exceeds VGRH , and so R is never chosen. Even if  increases by a small amount, the cuto¤
remains above VGRH and so project selection is unchanged. The second condition in part (ii) places
an upper bound on b and (1  p) to rule this out.
Part (iii) gives a su¢ cient condition for  > 0, and thus pure equity compensation to be
suboptimal. The condition is more likely to be satised if VBS   VBR and b are high, and p is low.
VBS   VBR measures the managers ability to destroy liquidation value by ine¢ ciently choosing R,
and thus the magnitude of the asset substitution e¤ect. If the rm has few tangible assets, creditors
recover very little regardless of the severity of liquidation: both VBS and VBR are close to zero. If
the rm has illiquid, tangible assets (such as buildings) that cannot be eroded by risk-taking, both
VBS and VBR are high. In both cases, VBS   VBR is low: there are few gains from making the
manager sensitive to the liquidation value, since he has little e¤ect on it. On the other hand, if
R reduces liquidation value (such as an advertising campaign, which transforms tangible cash into
an intangible asset), VBS   VBR is high and so the optimal level of inside debt is strictly positive.
Similarly, if e¤ort is e¤ective at improving liquidation value (b is high), then debt is e¤ective at
increasing e¤ort and so again inside debt is justied. If p falls, bankruptcy becomes likelier. This
increases the severity of the asset substitution issue; it also augments the e¤ectiveness of debt in
inducing e¤ort, because debt is sensitive to the rms value in bankruptcy which is enhanced by
e¤ort. Both factors lead to  > 0.
In sum, the previous literatures justication of exclusively equity-linked incentives is warranted
for rms where the agency costs of debt are low and e¤ort considerations are rst-order, such as
start-ups with high growth opportunities. However, inside debt is desirable in companies with a
signicant risk of bankruptcy (low p), where the investment decision a¤ects liquidation value (high
VBS   VBR), and where e¤ort can improve liquidation value (high b). One example is LBOs, which
are frequently undertaken in mature rms where the main agency problem is excessive investment.
Indeed, the private equity rm can be considered the managerin LBOs, given its close involvement
in operations, and typically holds strips of debt and equity to minimize conicts.
If the conditions in parts (ii) and (iii) are satised, then we have interior solutions for  and
. This permits comparative statics, which are given in parts (iv)-(vi). The intuition for part (iv)
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is standard. Parts (v) and (vi) consider the optimal ratio of debt to equity, k = =. The optimal
k is a trade-o¤ between its di¤erential e¤ects on project selection and e¤ort. For project selection,
k = 1 (i.e.  = ) is optimal as then V GR = V

GR. However, e¤ort considerations may cause the
optimal k to deviate from 1. To illustrate this, dene outputas
 = pgeg + (1  p) beb   E0   D0;
i.e. the contribution to rm value provided by e¤ort, minus the managers pay. We prove in the
Appendix that
@
@k
= 2p2g2
@
@k
+ 2(1  p)2b2k@(k)
@k
; (11)
@
@k
<
@(k)
@k
:
If e¤ort has a high expected productivity in solvency (either because solvency is likely (p is high) or
e¤ort is particularly e¤ective in solvency states (g is high relative to b)), then equity is more e¤ective
than debt in inducing e¤ort, since it is sensitive to the payo¤ in solvency. Thus, reducing debt and
increasing equity augments e¤ort; indeed, inspecting (11) shows that @
@k
< 0 if p is su¢ ciently high
and g is su¢ ciently larger than b.12 The Appendix proves that, if and only if @
@k
jk=k < 0, k < 1
and so the contract involves an equity bias ( < ). The condition in part (v), pF > 2(1  p)b2,
is a su¢ cient condition for @
@k
jk=k < 0 and is indeed satised if p is high and b is low. Even though
increasing k towards 1 would improve project selection, it would also reduce output, and so the
optimal k is less than 1. The actual value of k is a trade-o¤ between the positive e¤ect on project
selection and the negative e¤ect on e¤ort, and thus depends on the magnitude of the two agency
problems. If VBS  VBR is high, asset substitution is relatively important and so k is closer to the
level of 1 that optimizes project selection. If g rises, the benets from e¤ort are more concentrated
in solvency and so equity is more e¤ective at inducing e¤ort, reducing k. An increase in p augments
the potency of equity in inducing e¤ort and reduces the severity of asset substitution; both factors
reduce k.
Conversely, if p is low or b is high relative to g, then e¤ort has a high expected productivity
in liquidation and so debt is more e¤ective than equity in inducing e¤ort, since it is sensitive to
the liquidation payo¤. If and only if @
@k
jk=k > 0, we have k > 1 and the contract involves a debt
bias ( >  ). The condition in part (vi) is a su¢ cient condition for @
@k
jk=k > 0, and is indeed
satised if g and p are low. Even though increasing k above 1 leads to excessive conservatism in
project selection, it also improves output and so the optimal k exceeds 1. This debt bias contrasts
the traditional view that insu¢ cient e¤ort results from the agency costs of equity, i.e. raising too
much outside equity leaves the manager with too few shares. For a rm close to bankruptcy, e¤ort
may be more e¢ ciently induced by giving the manager more debt. For the comparative statics,
12Habib and Johnsen (2000) also feature the idea that equity induces an agent to improve rm value in solvency,
and debt induces an agent to improve rm value in bankruptcy. They consider a di¤erent setting where equity
(debt) is given to outside investors rather than the manager, to induce them to credibly assess the rms value in
its primary (secondary) use.
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the e¤ect of VBS   VBR is reversed: if it increases, project selection becomes more important and
so k should be closer to 1; since k > 1, this involves a reduction in k. A rise in F increases the
importance of asset substitution and has the same e¤ect. By contrast, an increase in b augments
the importance of e¤ort and so raises k.
While parts (i) to (vi) of Proposition 3 consider the optimal compensation scheme, part (vii)
addresses the e¤ect of the compensation scheme on security prices. An increase in  leads to greater
conservatism in project selection and thus increases (decreases) the value of debt (equity).
4. Empirical Implications
The model generates a number of empirical predictions involving inside debt as both an indepen-
dent and dependent variable, i.e. implications for the e¤ects of inside debt holdings and the rm
characteristics that a¤ect the optimal debt level. We outline the predictions below. Existing evi-
dence on pensions appears to be consistent with the rst ve; the other predictions are unexplored
and thus may be fruitful topics for future research.
The big picture prediction is that inside debt should be used in executive compensation,
whereas prior theories do not advocate debt. Indeed, Bebchuk and Jackson (2005), Sundaram and
Yermack (2007), and Gerakos (2007) document the extensive use of pensions. While pensions for
rank-and-le employees are typically insured by the Pension Benet Guaranty Corporation and thus
insensitive to bankruptcy, executive pensions typically substantially exceed the maximum insured
amount. In a bankruptcy, they represent unsecured, unfunded debt claims with equal priority
to other unsecured creditors.13 Thus, pensions constitute inside debt. Moreover, Sundaram and
Yermack nd the percentage debt stake exceeds the percentage equity stake for 13% of CEOs. This
nding represents an even sharper disparity with theories that advocate only equity, whereas this
paper shows that a debt bias is sometimes optimal. Moreover, current evidence understates the
extent of inside debt as it typically focuses on executive pensions and ignores deferred compensation,
owing to data limitations thus far. Section 409a of the Internal Revenue Code has recently increased
the reporting requirements for deferred compensation, and it would be useful to test the predictions
below using the CEOs total inside debt holdings; Wei and Yermack (2009) is one such paper that
does this. By contrast, there appears to be very little evidence for the xed bonuses advocated
by previous theories of stockholder-bondholder conicts. Murphys (1999) survey documents that
bonuses in practice are instead typically increasing in equity value (up to an upper limit), and thus
augment risk-shifting tendencies.
In addition to this high-levelprediction on the existence of debt, there are a number of detail-
levelcomparative statics predictions. In reality, g is likely to be signicantly higher than b and so
k < 1; indeed, empirically,  >  for 87% of CEOs, so we use part (v) of Proposition 3 to form the
empirical predictions. From (10), an increase in k augments the cuto¤V GR for the manager to
choose the risky project. Therefore, rm risk should decrease with the managers personal leverage
(i.e. his ratio of inside debt to equity). This is indeed found by Sundaram and Yermack, using
13See Sundaram and Yermack (2007) and Gerakos (2007) for further detail on the priority of pensions in bank-
ruptcy.
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distance to default as a measure of rm risk. Similarly, Gerakos nds that CEO pension holdings
are associated with higher credit ratings.
Empiricists sometimes measure the managers personal leverage not using percentages of debt
and equity (

) but using dollar values (

D0
E0
). Using this measure, the model predicts a positive
relationship between dollar personal leverage and rm leverage ( D0
D0+E0
) for two reasons. First, an
increase in rm leverage

D0
D0+E0

mechanically increases personal leverage through augmenting
the second term. Second, changes in the underlying parameters can jointly increase both rm and
personal leverage. From Proposition 3, an increase in b and a decrease in g both augment k. From
Equations (12) and (13) in the Appendix, these changes also increase D0 and reduce E0. Indeed,
Sundaram and Yermack nd a strong correlation between rm leverage and personal leverage.
In rms with growth options, the e¤ort decision is rst-order (g is high). Consequently, pension
entitlements should fall, as found by Gerakos. As with the leverage association, this relationship
is di¢ cult to reconcile with tax or stealth compensation justications for pensions, but consistent
with e¢ cient contracting. Indeed, Gerakos concludes that contracting variables explain a greater
proportion of pension levels than do measures of CEO power.
Turning from the determinants of the compensation scheme to its e¤ects, part (vii) of Propo-
sition 3 predicts that the value of debt (equity) should rise (fall) with inside debt holdings. SEC
regulations mandated disclosure of CEOs inside debt holdings (both pensions and deferred com-
pensation) in Spring 2007. Wei and Yermack (2009) nd that rms that disclosed large inside
debt holdings indeed experienced increases in bond prices and decreases in equity prices, and that
post-disclosure bond yields are signicantly positively related to k.
We now move to untested predictions. In Section 2, Case 1 (2) predicts that inside debt is
decreasing (increasing) in private benets. Case 2 depicts a highly levered rm for which liquidation
is very likely, and so Case 1 likely applies to the majority of rms. Sundaram and Yermack nd
that personal leverage is signicantly increasing in rm age, which is consistent since the present
value of future salary is lower for older managers closer to retirement. Note that this link is not
automatically mechanical while pension benets naturally increase over time with the CEOs
tenure, the same is true for equity compensation (e.g. Gibbons and Murphy, 1992.) However,
sharper tests of this prediction may be possible with measures of private benets that do not
depend on CEO age.
The last implication comes from Proposition 3, which predicts that inside debt is most valuable
where the manager has greatest e¤ect on liquidation values. Note that this is di¤erent from raw asset
tangibility: if assets are highly intangible (tangible), liquidation values are low (high) regardless of
the managers actions. A possible proxy could be the intensity of covenants.
It is important to note some caveats with interpreting recent pensions ndings as being fully
consistent with the model and thus evidence that real-life practices are optimal. In many rms,
pensions are su¢ ciently large, and have su¢ ciently similar payo¤s to debt, that they fulll the role
of inside debt advocated by the model and explain why executives do not need to hold actual debt
securities in addition. However, these conditions may not be fullled in certain circumstances, in
which case there may be an argument for supplementing pensions with actual debt, as advocated
by Bebchuk and Spamann (2009) in a normative proposal for compensation reform.
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First, existing studies are focused on large rms in the U.S. It is not clear whether these ndings
are representative of all rms, or of rms overseas. While Sundaram and Yermack nd that the
CEOs debt-equity mix is independent of rm size, potentially implying their results may also
apply to smaller rms outside their sample, this has yet to be directly shown. Further research is
necessary to investigate the generality of recent results.
Second, the model illustrates that the payo¤ of a pension has to be very similar to debt for it to
be e¤ective: small departures may lead to pensions either not a¤ecting or exacerbating the issue. If
debt is secured, pensions are junior and thus similar to the bonus J ; they may therefore encourage
risk-shifting (Proposition 3). In other cases, the payo¤ may be close to risk-free and thus pensions
do not a¤ect managerial incentives. Executives can put pension fund assets into a seculartrust
fund, ring-fenced from the reach of creditors, or a springingtrust which converts into a secular
trust upon trigger events, such as a credit downgrade. Note, however, that these trusts are very
rare. The CEOs of Delta Airlines and AMR (the parent of American Airlines) lost their jobs after
such trusts were disclosed (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007.)
Finally, debt securities may have a role even in companies where pensions are currently su¢ cient
to mitigate risk-shifting. Such rms may have low agency costs of debt because they are addressing
them by reducing leverage or inside equity.14 Since these measures are costly, the importance
of the agency costs of debt in practice cannot be ascertained solely by looking at actual cases
of risk-shifting. Debt grants may allow leverage or equity to increase, and thus be a less costly
solution.
5. Conclusion
The simplest theory of executive compensation would advocate aligning the manager with rm
value. Since empiricists have long believed that managers are compensated exclusively with cash
and equity in practice, a number of theory papers rationalize such a scheme. However, recent
research has shown that debt-like instruments such as pensions are in fact substantial components
of executive compensation. Debt is critically di¤erent from other instruments as it is sensitive to
the value of assets in bankruptcy. These ndings suggest the need for new theories to explain why
and when inside debt has a role in e¢ cient compensation, and how much debt should be used.
This paper is a rst step in this direction. Inside debt can be a more e¤ective solution to creditor
expropriation than salaries, bonuses, reputation and private benets, owing to its sensitivity to
liquidation value. When equity compensation is endogenized via an e¤ort decision, the optimal
level of inside debt is typically strictly positive and so pure equity compensation is ine¢ cient.
However, contrary to intuition, it typically does not equal the fraction of inside equity due to a
trade-o¤between e¤ort and project selection. An equity bias is usually optimal; the managers debt-
to-equity ratio is increasing in his e¤ect on the liquidation value and the probability of bankruptcy,
14There is a widely documented negative relationship between  and leverage (Friend and Lang, 1988; Agrawal
and Nagarajan, 1990; Ortiz-Molina, 2007). One interpretation is that rms for which high debt is optimal are
reducing the managers equity stake to attenuate risk-shifting (as predicted by John and John, 1993), or rms that
require high  to induce e¤ort are under-leveraging for the same reason.
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and decreasing in growth opportunities.
The model generates a number of empirical predictions, many of which appear to be supported
with existing ndings. However, since data on debt compensation has only recently become avail-
able, there are a number of untested predictions that may be interesting topics for future empirical
research. In terms of future theoretical directions, this paper has derived conditions under which
inside debt is superior to bonuses, and analyzed the optimal relative proportions of debt and equity
when compensation comprises of these instruments. It would be fruitful to study the conditions
under which debt is optimal in a general contract design setting.
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Appendix
Proof of Equation (3)
Rearranging Equations (1) and (2) yields
pRVGR   pSVGS  (1  pS)VBS   (1  pR)VBR
pRVGR   pSVGS  F (pR   pS) + 1

[(pS   pR) (F + J) + (1  pS)VBS   (1  pR)VBR]:
Equating the right-hand sides of each inequality leads to (3). To prove that the denominator of (3)
is positive, we have:
F (pS   pR) + (1  pS)VBS   (1  pR)VBR = (VBS   VBR)(1  pR) + (pS   pR) (F   VBS) > 0:
Proof of Proposition 1
To nd the cheapest contract that satises (3), we rst calculate the cost of debt and the bonus.
The rm is solvent with probability p = pRq + pS(1  q). A bonus of J costs pJ ; debt of  costs
[pF + q(1  pR)VBR + (1  q)(1  pS)VBS]:
Hence an incentive compatible contract will cost
W = pJ+

  J(pS   pR)
F (pS   pR) + (1  pS)VBS   (1  pR)VBR

[pF+q(1 pR)VBR+(1 q)(1 pS)VBS];
where
@W
@J
= p  (pS   pR)[pF + q(1  pR)VBR + (1  q)(1  pS)VBS]
F (pS   pR) + (1  pS)VBS   (1  pR)VBR :
Since the derivative is constant, we have a corner solution. The manager is paid entirely with debt
if @W
@J
> 0, i.e.,
pR(1  pS)VBS > pS(1  pR)VBR;
and entirely with the bonus if @W
@J
< 0:
Proof of Equation (6)
Rearranging (1) and (2) yields
pRVGR  pSVGS + (1  pS)VBS   (1  pR)VBR
pRVGR  pRF   1

pRJ +


[pSVGS + (1  pS)VBS   (1  pR)VBR   pRF ] :
Equating the left-hand sides of each inequality leads to (6).
Proof of Lemma 1
The managers objective function for e¤ort is given by:
pgeg +  (1  p) beb   1
2
e2g  
1
2
e2b
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and di¤erentiating with respect to eg and eb gives Equation (8).
Proof of Proposition 3
For conciseness, it is helpful to dene the following:
X =
(1  p)2
p
(VBS   VBR)2
VGRH   VGS
Y = p

VGRH + VGS
2
  F

:
From (10), the manager will choose S if and only if
VGR < VGS +
(1  p)
p
(VBS   VBR):
Since VGR  U [VGS; VGRH ], this occurs with probability min

1; (1 p)
p
VBS VBR
VGRH VGS

. There are
three cases to consider.
Case 1: (1 p)
p
VBS VBR
VGRH VGS  1 and at least one of  and  is strictly positive. Here, both R
and S are selected with strictly positive probability, and we need not worry about boundary cases.
Then the values of equity and debt are given by:
E0 = p
VGRH + VGS +
(1 p)
p
(VBS   VBR)
2
 VGRH   VGS  
(1 p)
p
(VBS   VBR)
VGRH   VGS
+pVGS  (1  p)
p
VBS   VBR
VGRH   VGS   pF + p
2g2
= Y   
2
22
X + p2g2: (12)
D0 = [pF + (1  p)VBR]
VGRH   VGS   (1 p)p (VBS   VBR)
VGRH   VGS
+[pF + (1  p)VBS] (1  p)
p
VBS   VBR
VGRH   VGS + (1  p)
2b2
= pF + (1  p)VBR + 

X + (1  p)2b2: (13)
Di¤erentiating the objective function (7) with respect to  and  yields:
() :  (1  ) 
2
X  D0 + (1  )

X

+ (1  p)2b2

= 0 (14)
() :  E0 + (1  )

2
3
X + p2g2

+ (1  )

  
2
X

= 0: (15)
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Using the expressions for E0 and D0 in (12) and (13), the above rst-order conditions become:
() :   [pF + (1  p)VBR] +

1  

  
2

X + (1  2)(1  p)2b2 = 0 (16)
() :  Y +

2
22
+
2
3
  
2

X + (1  2)p2g2 = 0: (17)
Case 2: (1 p)
p
VBS VBR
VGRH VGS > 1 and at least one of  and  is strictly positive. In this case, S is
always selected. Shareholderspayo¤ (7) is
(1  ) (pVGS   pF + p2g2) + (1  )(pF + (1  p)VBS + (1  p)2b2):
Di¤erentiating this yields
 = max

0;
pg2   (VGS   F )
2pg2

(18)
 =
(1  p)2b2   (pF + (1  p)VBS)
2(1  p)2b2 : (19)
There is no max (0; ) function for  since (1 p)
p
VBS VBR
VGRH VGS > 1 rules out 
 = 0.
Case 3:  =  = 0. This must be considered separately from Cases 1 and 2 since the expression
(1 p)
p
VBS VBR
VGRH VGS is undened. We assume that the manager takes the e¢ cient project in this case.
Proof of part (i)
For Cases 2 and 3, it is immediate that  < 1
2
and  < 1
2
, so we only need to tackle Case 1.
First, we consider the case in which the optimum is on the boundaries of Case 1, and so the
rst-order conditions do not apply. The boundaries of Case 1 are f(; ) :  = 0;  > 0g and
f(; ) : (1 p)
p
VBS VBR
VGRH VGS = 1g. On the boundary f(; ) :  = 0;  > 0g, shareholderspayo¤ is
(1  )(Y + p2g2) + pF + (1  p)VBR:
Di¤erentiating this yields
 =
p2g2   Y
2p2g2
 = 0;
and so  < 1
2
and  < 1
2
.
The second boundary can be rewritten f(; k) : k(1 p)
p
VBS VBR
VGRH VGS = 1g. Shareholders solve
max
;
(1  )(pVGS   pF + p2g2) + (1  )(pF + (1  p)VBS + (1  p)2b2)
subject to the constraint
(1  p)
p
VBS   VBR
VGRH   VGS = 1:
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Dening A = p(VGRH VGS)
(1 p)(VBS VBR) , we have
 =
p2g2   p(VGS   F ) + A[(1  p)2b2   pF   (1  p)VBS]
2[p2g2 + A2(1  p)2b2]
 = A:
It is automatic that  < 1
2
. A necessary condition for the optimum to be on this boundary is that
@
@k

(1  )(Y   1
2
k2X + p2g2) + (1  k)(pF + kX + (1  p)2b2k)

 0
at k = A. This derivative at k = A equals:
 (1  )kX   [pF + kX + (1  p)2b2k] + (1  k)(X + (1  p)2b2)
  [pF + (1  p)(VBS   VBR)  (1  2k)(1  p)2b2]: (20)
For the derivative to be non-negative, 1  2k must be positive and so  = k < 1
2
.
We now move to the interior of Case 1, which allows us to use rst-order conditions. If   1
2
,
then from (16) we must have 1 

  
2
> 0. This yields
 >

1   
1=2
1  1=2 = 1:
This is a contradiction, so  < 1
2
.
Similarly, from (17), we have
 Y + 
2
22
X

+

2
3
  
2

X + (1  2)p2g2 = 0:
From (12), the rst term is the negative of the value of equity if g = 0. Since equity value must
be positive, this rst term must be negative. Thus if   1
2
, we must have 
2
3
  
2
> 0, i.e.  < .
However, since  < 1
2
, this is inconsistent with   1
2
. Hence  < 1
2
.
Proof of part (ii)
First, we derive a su¢ cient condition to rule out Case 3 being optimal. Under Case 3, share-
holderspayo¤ is
VGRH + VGS
2
+
1
2
X + (1  p)VBR:
To show that Case 3 is suboptimal, it is su¢ cient to prove that shareholderspayo¤ is lower
than under Case 1 with an arbitrary contract then it will denitely be lower than under Case 1
with the optimal contract. Consider the contract  =  = . Then, in Case 1, shareholderspayo¤
is
(1  )

p2g2+ (1  p)2b2+ VGRH + VGS
2
+
1
2
X + (1  p)VBR

:
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The derivative of this function with respect to  at  = 0 is
p2g2 + (1  p)2b2   VGRH + VGS
2
  1
2
X   (1  p)VBR:
Thus, to rule out  =  = 0, it is su¢ cient to show that
p2g2 + (1  p)2b2 > VGRH + VGS
2
+
1
2
X + (1  p)VBR: (21)
In addition, if (1 p)2b2 [pF+(1 p)(VBS VBR)] < 0, then  in Equation (19) is negative and so
Case 2 is not feasible. Hence, the optimum must be Case 1. Since Case 1 involves (1 p)
p
VBS VBR
VGRH VGS 
1, we have  > 0.
Proof of part (iii)
Condition (21) is su¢ cient to rule out Case 3. Case 2 requires (1 p)
p
VBS VBR
VGRH VGS > 1 so 
 > 0
automatically holds. We thus only need to consider Case 1. Di¤erentiating the objective (7) with
respect to  yields:
  [pF + (1  p)VBR] +

1  

  
2

X + (1  2)(1  p)2b2:
At  = 0, this becomes
  [pF + (1  p)VBR] + 1

X + (1  p)2b2:
Since  < 1
2
, 2X > pF + (1   p)VBR   (1   p)2b2 is su¢ cient to guarantee that this derivative is
positive and so  > 0.
Proof of part (iv)
First, note that the condition (1   p)2b2   [pF + (1   p)(VBS   VBR)]  0 in part (ii) of the
Proposition guarantees that (20), the derivative at the boundary where (1 p)
p
VBS VBR
VGRH VGS = 1, is
negative. Thus, the optimum is interior and so we can use rst-order conditions.
Di¤erentiating the objective (7) with respect to , and treating  as a function of , yields
 Y @
@
  pF   (1  p)VBR +X
"
  @
@

2

1  


+
2
22
@
@
  

#
+ (1  2) p2g2@
@
+ (1  2) (1  p)2b2 = 0: (22)
If we solve for  from (17), then the solution for  is independent of b. Let h denote the left
hand side of (22). Thus, the partial derivative of h with respect to b is 2 (1  2) (1  p)2b. From
h(; b) = 0, we have @h
@
@
@b
+ @h
@b
= 0; since @h
@
< 0 at the optimum, the sign of @
@b
is the same as the
sign of @h
@b
. The latter is positive since  < 1
2
. Thus,  is increasing in b. A similar analysis proves
that  is increasing in g.
Proof of parts (v) and (vi)
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Dening k = 

and plugging into (16) and (17) yields the rst-order conditions:
() :   [pF + (1  p)VBR] +

1  k

  k
2

X + (1  2k)(1  p)2b2 = 0 (23)
() :  Y +

k2
2
+
k2

  k


X + (1  2)p2g2 = 0: (24)
Multiplying (14) by k and adding it to (15) yields:
E0 + D0 = (1  )(1  p)2b2 + (1  )p2g2: (25)
Using the expressions for E0 and D0 in (12) and (13) yields
Y +
1
2
k2X + [pF + (1  p)VBR] k = p2g2(1  2) + (1  p)2b2(k)(1  2k); (26)
and so
 =
p2g2 + (1  p)2b2k   Y   1
2
k2X   k [pF + (1  p)VBR]
2[p2g2 + (1  p)2b2k2] : (27)
Inserting (25) into (7) gives the shareholdersobjective function as:
V0   [(1  )(1  p)2b2 + (1  )p2g2]:
Di¤erentiating this with respect to k, and treating  as a function of k, yields:
f(k; ) = X(1  k) + 2p2g2@
@k
+ 2(1  p)2b2k@(k)
@k
= 0: (28)
(All of these derivatives are being evaluated at k = k; we suppress jk=knotation for brevity.)
Divide the left side of the equation into two parts:
f1 = X(1  k)
f2 = 2p
2g2
@
@k
+ 2(1  p)2b2k@(k)
@k
:
The rst part represents the e¤ect of k on project selection; the second represents the e¤ect on
e¤ort, i.e. f2 =
@
@k
. From (28), it is easy to see that k < 1 if and only if @
@k
< 0.
We are interested in the relationship between k and a parameter . From f(k; ) = 0, we have
@f
@k
@k
@
+ @f
@
= 0. Since @f
@k
< 0 at a maximum, the sign of @k
@
is the same as the sign of @f
@
. @f1
@
is
simple to calculate; for @f2
@
, we have
@f2
@
=
@
@

@
@k
(p2g22 + (1  p)2b2(k)2)

=
@
@k

@
@
(p2g22 + (1  p)2b2(k)2)

:
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From (27), we have
p2g22 + (1  p)2b2(k)2 = [p
2g2 + (1  p)2b2k   Y   1
2
k2X   k [pF + (1  p)VBR]]2
4[p2g2 + (1  p)2b2k2] ;
and so
@f2
@
=
@
@k
@
@

[p2g2 + (1  p)2b2k   Y   1
2
k2X   k [pF + (1  p)VBR]]2
4[p2g2 + (1  p)2b2k2]

:
Di¤erentiating (27) with respect to k gives
@
@k
=
(1  p)2b2   kX   [pF + (1  p)VBR]
2[p2g2 + (1  p)2b2k2]
  p
2g2 + (1  p)2b2k   Y   1
2
k2X   k [pF + (1  p)VBR]
2[p2g2 + (1  p)2b2k2]2  2(1  p)
2b2k
=
(1  p)2b2   kX   [pF + (1  p)VBR]
2[p2g2 + (1  p)2b2k2]  
2(1  p)2b2k
p2g2 + (1  p)2b2k2 : (29)
From (23) we have:
(1  p)2b2   kX   [pF + (1  p)VBR] = k   1

X + 2k(1  p)2b2:
Inserting this into (29) yields:
@
@k
=
(k   1)X
2[p2g2 + (1  p)2b2k2]  
(1  p)2b2k
p2g2 + (1  p)2b2k2 : (30)
We commence with the case of pF + (1   p)VBR > 2(1   p)b2, considered in part (v) of the
Proposition. (23) yields 1 k

  k
2
> 0. This implies 1  k   k > 0, and so k < 1
1+
< 1. From
(30), we have @
@k
< 0. We now calculate @f
@
for various parameters . For  = VBS   VBR, we have
@f1
@
=
2X
VBS   VBR (1  k)
@f2
@
=   X
VBS   VBR
@(k2)
@k
:
Hence,
@f
@
=
X
VBS   VBR

2(1  k)  @(k
2)
@k

=
X
VBS   VBR

2(1  k   k)  k2@
@k

; (31)
Since (1  k   k) > 0 and @
@k
< 0, this is positive.
For  = g, @f
@
depends on the sign of
(1  2)@
@k
:
Since  < 1
2
and @
@k
< 0, this is negative.
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For  = p, it depends on the sign of
1
2
@X
@p

2(1  k)  @(k
2)
@k

  2(1  p)b2(1  2k)  (F   VBR)
+ 2
@
@k

(1  2)pg2   (1  p)b2k(1  2k)  1
2

k(F   VBR) +

VGRH + VGS
2
  F

:
From (31), we know 2(1   k)   @(k2)
@k
> 0; since also  = k < 1
2
, the rst three terms of the
above expression are negative. For the whole expression to be negative, it is su¢ cient to show that
(1  2)pg2   (1  p)b2k(1  2k)  1
2

k(F   VBR) +
 
VGRH+VGS
2
  F > 0 (since @
@k
< 0). From
(26), we know that
(1  2)pg2 = 1
p

Y +
1
2
k2X

+
1
p
[pF + (1  p)VBR] k   (1  p)
2
p
b2k(1  2k);
and so
(1  2)pg2   (1  p)b2k(1  2k)  1
2

k(F   VBR) +

VGRH + VGS
2
  F

=
1
p

1
2
Y +
1
2
k2X

+ k

1
2
F +
1  p
p
VBR +
1
2
VBR

  1  p
p
b2k(1  2k):
This is positive, since the rst term is positive, and the combination of the second and third terms
is positive because pF + (1  p)VBR > 2(1  p)b2. Thus k is decreasing in p.
We now turn to the case of Y > 1
2
X + p2g2, considered in part (vi) of the Proposition. From
(24), we have 
k2

  k


X = Y   k
2
2
X   (1  2)p2g2:
If k  1, then the right hand side of the above equation is positive, which implies that k2

  k

> 0,
i.e. k > 1. This is a contradiction, so we must have k > 1. We also have
@(k)
@k
= + k
@
@k
= +
k(k   1)X
2[p2g2 + (1  p)2b2k2]  
(1  p)2b2k2
p2g2 + (1  p)2b2k2
=
k(k   1)X
2[p2g2 + (1  p)2b2k2] +
p2g2
p2g2 + (1  p)2b2k2 > 0 when k > 1: (32)
Therefore, @(k
2)
@k
must be also positive. We also have @(k)
@k
> @
@k
. For k > 1, this is immediate by
comparing (30) with (32). For k < 1, note that @(k)
@k
> @
@k
if and only if  >
 
1  


@
@k
. If k < 1,
@
@k
< 0 and so the right-hand side of this inequality is negative and less than the left-hand side.
From (31), k is decreasing in VBS   VBR. For  = b, @f@ depends on the sign of
(1  2k)@(k)
@k
;
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which is positive, and so k is increasing in b. For  = F , @f
@
depends on the sign of
@
@k
((1  k)) = @
@k
  @(k)
@k
;
which is negative, and so k is decreasing in F .
Proof of part (vii)
Immediate from Equations (12) and (13).
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